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Abstract
We propose two rational expectation models of transient financial bubbles with hetero-
geneous arbitrageurs and positive feedbacks leading to self-reinforcing transient stochas-
tic faster-than-exponential price dynamics. As a result of the nonlinear feedbacks, the
termination of a bubble is found to be characterized by a finite-time singularity in the
bubble price formation process ending at some potential critical time t˜c, which follows a
mean-reversing stationary dynamics. Because of the heterogeneity of the rational agents’
expectations, there is a synchronization problem for the optimal exit times determined
by these arbitrageurs, which leads to the survival of the bubble almost all the way to its
theoretical end time. The explicit exact analytical solutions of the two models provide
nonlinear transformations which allow us to develop novel tests for the presence of bub-
bles in financial time series. Avoiding the difficult problem of parameter estimation of
the stochastic differential equation describing the price dynamics, the derived operational
procedures allow us to diagnose bubbles that are in the making and to forecast their termi-
nation time. The tests performed on three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from
1 February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index from 1 January
1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986 to 30
November 2008, suggest the feasibility of advance bubble warning.
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1 Introduction
Bubbles and crashes in financial markets are of global significance because of their effects on the lives
and livelihoods of a majority of the world’s population. While pundits and experts alike line up after
the fact to claim that a particular bubble was obvious in hindsight, the real time development of the
bubble is often characterized by either a deafening silence or a cacophony of contradictory opinions.
Here, we propose two models of financial bubbles, from which we develop the corresponding oper-
ational procedures to diagnose bubbles that are in the making and to forecast their termination time.
The tests performed on three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from 1 February 1980 to 31
October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index from 1 January 1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong
Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986 to 30 November 2008, demonstrate the feasibility
of advance bubble warning on the major market regimes that were followed by crashes or extended
market downturns. The empirical results support the hypothesis that financial bubbles result from
positive feedbacks operating on the price and/or on its momentum, leading to faster-than-exponential
transients.
These results should be appreciated from the perspective of the present state-of-art on modeling
and detecting bubbles. There is no really satisfactory theory of bubbles, which both encompasses its
different possible mechanisms and adheres to reasonable economic principles (no or limited arbitrage,
equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium with only transient deviations, bounded rationality). Part of the
reason that the literature is still uncertain on even how to define a bubble is that an exponentially
growing price can always be argued to result from some fundamental economic factor (Gurkaynak,
2008; Lux and Sornette, 2002). This is related to the problem that the fundamental price is not directly
observable, giving no strong anchor to understand observed prices. Another fundamental difficulty
is to go beyond equilibrium to out-of-equilibrium set-ups (Brock, 1993; Brock and Hommes, 1999;
Chiarella et al., 2008; Hommes and Wagener, 2008).
Two conditions are in general invoked as being necessary for prices to deviate from fundamental
value. First, there must be some degree of irrationality in the market. That is, investors’ demand
for stocks must be driven by something other than fundamentals, like overconfidence in the future.
Second, even if a market has such investors, the general argument is that rational investors will drive
prices back to fundamental value. For this not to happen, there needs to be some limits on arbitrage.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a description for various limits of arbitrage. With respect to the
equity market, clearly the most important impediment to arbitrage are short sales restrictions. Roughly
70% of mutual funds explicitly state (in SEC Form N-SAR) that they are not permitted to sell short
(Almazan et al., 2004). Seventy-nine percent of equity mutual funds make no use of derivatives
whatsoever (either futures or options), suggesting further that funds do not take synthetically short
positions (Koski and Pontiff, 1999). These figures indicate that the vast majority of funds never take
short positions. Then, the argument goes that bubbles can develop because prices reflect mainly the
remaining optimistic opinions and not the negative views of pessimistic traders who are already out
of the market, and who would take short positions, if given the opportunity.
One important class of theories shows that there can be large movements in asset prices due to the
combined effects of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints. The basic idea finds its root in
the original CAPM theories, in particular, the model of Lintner (1969) of asset prices with investors
having heterogeneous beliefs. Lintner and many others after him, show that widely inflated prices
can occur (Miller, 1977; Jarrow, 1980; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Chen et al., 2002; Scheinkman
and Xiong, 2003; Duffie et al., 2002). In these models that assume heterogeneous beliefs and short
sales restrictions, the asset prices are determined at equilibrium to the extent that they reflect the
heterogeneous beliefs about payoffs. But short sales restrictions force the pessimistic investors out
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of the market, leaving only optimistic investors and thus inflated asset price levels. However, when
short sales restrictions no longer bind investors, then prices fall back down. This provides a possible
account of the bursting of the Internet bubble that developed in 1998-2000. Many of these models
take into account explicitly the relationship between the number of publicly tradable shares of an asset
and the propensity for speculative bubbles to form. So far, the theoretical models based on agents
with heterogeneous beliefs facing short sales restrictions are considered among the most convincing
models to explain the burst of the Internet bubbles.
The role of “noise traders” in fostering positive feedback trading has been emphasized by a num-
ber of models. For instance, DeLong et al. (1990) introduced a model of market bubbles and crashes
which exploits this idea of the role of noise traders in the development of bubbles, as a possible
mechanism for why asset prices may deviate from the fundamentals over rather long time periods.
Their work was followed by a number of behavioral models based on the idea that trend chasing by
one class of agents produces momentum in stock prices (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998;
Hong et al., 2005). An influential empirical evidence on momentum strategies came from the work
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001), which established that stock returns exhibit momentum be-
havior at intermediate horizons. Strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past
and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3- to
12- month holding periods. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) documented long-term reversals in stock
returns. Stocks that perform poorly in the past perform better over the next 3 to 5 years than stocks
that perform well in the past. These findings present a serious challenge to the view that markets are
semi-strong-form efficient.
It is important to understand what mechanisms prevent arbitrageurs from removing a bubble as
soon as they see one. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) have proposed that bubbles continue to grow
due to a failure of synchronization of rational traders, so that the later choose to ride rather than
arbitrage bubbles. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) consider a market where arbitrageurs face syn-
chronization risk and, as a consequence, delay usage of arbitrage opportunities. Rational arbitrageurs
are supposed to know that the market will eventually collapse. They know that the bubble will burst
as soon as a sufficient number of (rational) traders will sell out. However, the dispersion of rational ar-
bitrageurs’ opinions on market timing and the consequent uncertainty on the synchronization of their
sell-off are delaying this collapse, allowing the bubble to grow. In this framework, bubbles persist
in the short and intermediate term because short sellers face synchronization risk, that is, uncertainty
regarding the timing of the correction. As a result, arbitrageurs who conclude that the arbitrageurs are
yet unlikely to trade against the bubble find it optimal to ride the still-growing bubble for a while.
Bhattacharya and Yu (2008) provide a summary of recent efforts to expand on the above concepts,
in particular to address the two main questions of (i) the cause(s) of bubbles and crashes and (ii) the
possibility to diagnose them ex-ante. Many financial economists recognize that positive feedbacks
and in particular herding is a key factor for the growth of bubbles. Herding can result from a variety
of mechanisms, such as anticipation by rational investors of noise traders’ strategies (DeLong et al.,
1990), agency costs and monetary incentives given to competing fund managers (Dass et al., 2008)
sometimes leading to the extreme Ponzi schemes, rational imitation in the presence of uncertainty
(Roehner and Sornette, 2000) and social imitation. The bubble models developed here build strongly
on this accepted notion of herding. We refer to Kaizoji and Sornette (2008) for an extensive review
complementing this brief survey.
The present paper takes its roots in the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model (Johansen et al.,
1999, 2000) formulated in the Blanchard-Watson framework of rational expectation bubbles (Blan-
chard, 1979; Blanchard and Watson, 1982). The JLS model combined a representation of the herding
behavior of noise traders controlling a crash hazard rate with the arbitrage response of rational traders
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on the asset price. One implication of the JLS model is the transient faster-than-exponential acceler-
ation of the price due to the positive feedback associated with the herding behavior of noise traders.
This faster-than-exponential pattern can theoretically culminate in a finite-time singularity, which
characterizes the end of the bubble and the time at which the crash is the most probable. Other mod-
els have explored further the hypothesis that bubbles can be the result of positive feedbacks and that
the dynamical signature of bubbles derives from the interplay between fundamental value investment
and more technical analysis. The former can be embodied in nonlinear extensions of the standard
financial Black-Scholes model of log-price variations (Sornette and Andersen, 2002; Ide and Sor-
nette, 2002; Corcos et al., 2002; Andersen and Sornette, 2004). The later requires more significant
extensions to account for the competition between inertia between analysis and decisions, positive
momentum feedbacks and negative value investment feedbacks (Sornette and Ide, 2002). Close to
our present formulation, Sornette and Andersen (2002); Andersen and Sornette (2004) develop a non-
linear generalization of the Black-Scholes process which can be solved analytically. The nonlinear
feedback is acting as the effect of price on future growth, according to the view that high prices lead
to a wealth effect that drives behavioral investors to invest more aggressively.
The present paper adds to the literature by developing two related models of transient bubbles
in which their terminations occur at some potential critical time t˜c, which follows a mean-reversing
stationary process with a fixed unconditional mean Tc. These models provides straightforward ways to
determine the potential critical time without confronting the difficult problem of parameter estimation
of the stochastic differential equation describing the price dynamics of price. In our models, rational
arbitrageurs can diagnose bubbles but do not know precisely when they end. These investors are
assumed to form rational expectations of the potential critical time but not necessarily of the detailed
price process itself, which form a much weaker condition for investors’ rationality. Furthermore,
we assume that rational arbitrageurs hold consistent expectation for the potential critical time with
unbiased errors. Although rational arbitrageurs know that the bubble will burst at its critical time,
they can not make a deterministic prediction of this time and therefore of when other arbitrageurs
will sell out, because they have little knowledge about others’ belief about the process governing the
stochastic critical time t˜c. Our rational investors continuously update their beliefs on the probable
termination of the bubble, according to their observation of the development of the bubble. They exit
the market by maximizing their expected payoff, based on their subjective perception of the market
bubble risk and the knowledge of the bubble dynamics. Because of the heterogeneity of these rational
agents’ expectations, there is a synchronization problem between these arbitrageurs, which leads to
the survival of the bubble almost all the way to its theoretical end time. In this respect, our model
is reminiscent to that of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), since the resilience of the bubble results
from the lack of synchronization between arbitrageurs on the decision to exit the bubble due to the
heterogeneity of their optimal exit times. Our models have the advantage of being quantitatively
testable and their concrete implementation provides diagnostics of bubbles in real time series, as we
demonstrate below.
The first model, which leads to a finite-time singularity in the price dynamics with stochastic
critical time is presented in the next section 2. This model generalizes Sornette and Andersen’s
model to allow for a mean reversal dynamics of the bubble end. Section 3 present a second model
leading to a finite-time singularity in the momentum price dynamics with stochastic critical time. Both
models exemplify the importance of positive feedback, which is quantified by a unique exponent m.
A value of m larger than 1 (respectively 2) characterize a bubble regime in the first (respectively
second) model. The two models can be solved exactly in explicit analytical forms. These solutions
provide nonlinear transformations which allow us to develop novel tests for the presence of bubbles in
financial time series. These two classes of tests, one for each bubble model, are developed respectively
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in subsections 4.1 and 4.2 and applied on three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from 1
February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index from 1 January 1980 to 31 July
2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986 to 30 November 2008. Section 5
concludes.
2 First bubble model: finite-time singularity in the price dynam-
ics with stochastic critical time
Financial bubbles are often viewed as being characterized by anomalously high growth rates resulting
from temporary over-optimistic beliefs in a ‘new economy’ or in a ‘paradigm shift’ of the fundamen-
tal structure of productivity gains. However, this definition is unsatisfactory because a high growth
rate associated with an exponentially growing price can always be justified by some other fundamen-
tal valuation models which use higher discount factors and larger dividend growth expectations, or
introduce new accounting rules incorporating for instance the benefits of real options. This definition
also leaves a large ambiguity as to when the bubble is supposed to end, or when a crash might occur.
In contrast, we define a bubble as a transient faster-than-exponential growth of the price, which
would end in a finite-time-singularity in the absence of a crash or change of regime. Such ‘super-
exponential regime’ results from the existence of positive nonlinear feedback mechanisms amplifying
past price increases into even faster growth rates. These positive nonlinear feedback mechanisms may
be due to a variety of causes, including derivative hedging strategies, portfolio insurance methods or
to imitative behaviors of bounded rational arbitrageurs and of noise traders. While herding has been
largely documented to be a trait of noise traders, it is actually rational for bounded rational agents to
also enter into social imitation, as the collective behavior may reveal information otherwise hidden
to the agents. As a result of the nonlinear positive feedbacks, the bubble price becomes less and less
coupled to the market fundamentals, and the super-exponential growth of the price makes the market
more and more unstable. In this scenario, the end of the bubble conditional on the absence of crash
occurs at a critical time at which the market becomes maximally unstable. The end of the bubble is
therefore the time when the crash is the most probable. With or without a crash, the end of the bubble
signals the end of the transient super-exponential growth, and the transition to a different regime, with
unspecified characteristics.
Here, we assume that sophisticated market participants are indeed aware of the current bubble
state, and that they know the price is growing towards its final singularity which will occur at some
future random critical time at which the market may collapse with a finite probability (but not with
certainty). Our bounded rational agents are able to form unbiased rational expectations of the critical
time corresponding to the end of the bubble at which the crash is the more probable. We assume
that these sophisticated arbitrageurs enter sequentially into the market, attracted by the potential large
gains, given their anticipation of the crash risk quantified by their estimation of the critical end time
of the bubble which is formed when they enter the market. Because their anticipations of the bubble
demise are heterogeneous, they solve an optimal timing problem with distinct inputs, which leads
to different exit strategies. The heterogeneity in their exit strategies is common knowledge among
these arbitrageurs, and results in a lack of coordination, ensuring the persistence of the bubble. This
synchronization problem is analogous to that identified by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003). However,
for Abreu and Brunnermeier, the lack of synchronization stems from the existence of heterogeneous
beliefs on the start of the bubble, i.e., arbitrageurs have “sequential awareness” and do not know
whether they have learn the information on the mispricing early or late relative to other rational
arbitrageurs. In contrast, our model emphasizes that the lack of synchronization results from the
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heterogeneous beliefs concerning the end of the bubble. Many reports both in the academic and
professional literature state that sophisticated participants like hedge-funds correctly diagnosed the
presence of a bubble and actually “surfed” the bubbles, attracted by the potential large gains. Many
reported that the largest uncertainty was how long it would continue its course (Gurkaynak, 2008;
Sullivan, 2009)
Less sophisticated traders investing in the market have little knowledge on the bubble duration and
their action add noise which is assumed to have an influence only on the critical time characterizing
the end of the bubble, while the super-exponential growth of the price remains robust. In the bubble
regime, a well-defined nonlinear exponent characterizes the positive feedbacks at the origin of the
bubble. The noisy character of the critical time tc of the end of the bubble is modeled by an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. Intuitively, the price trail resembles the trace of a bug climbing erratically along
a hanging curved rope attached to a vibrating support.
Specifically, the price dynamics in the bubble regime is assumed to be described by the following
stochastic differential equation:
dp = µpm(1 + δ(p, t))dt+ σpmdW , (1)
where the exponent m > 1 embodies the positive feedback mechanism, in which a high price p
pushes even further the demand so that the return and its volatility tend to be a nonlinear accelerating
function of p. When m > 1, we will show that the price diverges in finite time. The time at which
this divergence occurs is referred to as the critical time t˜c. As we will see later, the term δ(x, t) is
a time-varying regulator term that governs the behavior of t˜c, µ is the instantaneous return rate, σ is
the volatility of the returns and W is the standard Wiener process. This model recovers the standard
Black-Scholes model of the geometric random walk with drift µ and standard deviation σ for m = 1
and δ = 0.
Let us consider first the case where δ(p, t) = σ = 0, so that expression (1) reduces to dp = µpmdt,
whose solution is
p = K(tc − t)−β , (2)
where β = 1
m−1 , K = (
β
µ
)β , tc =
p
−(m−1)
0
(m−1)µ and p0 denotes the price at the start time of the bubble
taken to be t = 0. Since β > 0 for m > 1, expression (2) exemplifies the existence of a finite-time
(or “movable” , Bender and Orszag (1999)) singularity of the price that goes to infinity in finite time
as t→ t−c . This pathological behavior is the direct consequence of the positive feedback embodied in
the condition m > 1.
Motivated by this simple analytical solution, we now consider the more general process (1) and
specify δ(p, t) in order to obtain a general process with stochastic finite time singularities. We postu-
late the following specific form for the process governing δ(p, t),
δ(p, t) = α t˜c(t) +
1
2
mµσ2 [p(t)]m−1 , (3)
where
dt˜c = −αt˜cdt+ (σ/µ)dW (4)
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with zero unconditional mean. The Wiener process in (4) is
the same as the one in (1). We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Provided that δ(p, t) follows the process (3) with (4), the solution of equation (1) can
be written under a form similar to (2) as follows,
p(t) = K(T˜c − t)−β , (5)
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with
β =
1
m− 1 , K =
(
β
µ
)β
, Tc =
β
µ
p
− 1
β
0 , T˜c = Tc + t˜c . (6)
The proof of Proposition (1) is given in Appendix A.
Note that
E(T˜c) = E(Tc + t˜c) = Tc . (7)
Therefore, Tc given in (6) is the expected time at which the bubble will end in an explosive singularity.
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (4) for t˜c(t) expresses that the end of the bubble cannot be known
with certainty but is instead a stochastic variable. Nonetheless, due to the positive feedback, the
price can explode in finite time, but the end of the bubble can at best be known to follow the mean-
reversing process (4). The time Tc can be interpreted as the consensus rational expectation formed
by sophisticated arbitrageurs of the stochastic critical time T˜c as which the bubble is expected to end.
But each trading day t discloses a different ‘actual’ critical time Tc + tc(t) which is vibrating around
its expected value Tc.
Our model assumes that there is no coordination mechanism that would ensure the exchange
of information among the sophisticated arbitrageurs concerning their expectation of the end of the
bubble. The arbitrageurs reveal their private information only upon entering the market. We assume
that they do so sequentially, based on their heterogeneous beliefs on the process t˜c. And the process
t˜c is an emergent property that results from the aggregation of market beliefs rather than from the
action of single arbitrageur. Being aware of the escalating level of the bubble that has not yet burst,
each arbitrageur will ride the bubble for a while and identify the best exit strategy according to the
maximization of her risk-adjusted return based on her belief.
Let us denote ti > 0 the time at which the i’s arbitrageur has entered the market. Being aware of
the form (5) of the price dynamics, at each instant t, the rational arbitrageur forms a belief quantified
by her hazard rate hi(t), of the probability that a crash might occur in the next instant, conditional on
the fact that it has not yet happened. This allows her to estimate the probability 1 − Πi(t) that the
crash will not happen until time t. Given the explosive form (5) of the price dynamics, we assume
that the arbitrageur forms a belief of the crash hazard rate which is of the same form, that is,
hi(t) =
pii(t)
1− Πi(t) ∝ (Tc,i − t)
−βi , (8)
where Πi(t) is the arbitrageur i’s conditional cumulative distribution function of the bursting date and
pii(t) represents the associated conditional density. Tc,i = Tc+ t˜c,i denotes the critical time for the end
of the bubble that the arbitrageur i has estimated when entering the market. We allow the exponent
βi to be different from arbitrageur to arbitrageur, so as to reflect different views on the riskiness
of the market, which can translate into distinct risk aversions: the larger the exponent βi, the more
pessimistic is the view of the arbitrageur concerning the imminence of the crash, because a larger βi
implies a faster divergence of the crash hazard rate.
The occurrence of the market collapse is posited to be triggered when a sufficiently large number
η of arbitrageurs have exited the market, leading to a large price movement, amplified by the herding
of noise traders. Their cumulative effect is accounted for by a postulated percent loss κ of the crash,
which is itself a random variable. Given such an environment, the date to exit the market for a given
rational arbitrageur i determines her best trade strategy, which is found as the solution of the following
optimization problem
max
t
Ei[(1− Πi(t)) · dp− pii(t)dt · κp] . (9)
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The first term (1 − Πi(t)) · dp represents the arbitrageur’s instantaneous benefit at t + dt provided
that the burst of the bubble has not yet happened. The second term pii(t)dt · κp is the instantaneous
cost supported by the arbitrageur when the bubble bursts. The solution of (9) is obtained from the
first-order condition
(1− Πi(t))Ei(µpm(1 + δ(p, t))) = pii(t)Ei(κp) . (10)
We can thus state
Proposition 2. Given a population of heterogeneous arbitrageurs, which form their expectation of the
crash hazard rate according to (8) with heterogeneous anticipated critical times Tc,i and exponents
βi reflecting their different views on the riskiness of the market, a given arbitrageur i decides to exit
the market at the date texi which is the solution of
Ei[dp(texi )]
Ei[κp(texi )]
= hi(t
ex
i ) ∝ (Ti,c − texi )−βi . (11)
Since Ei(p) 6= Ej(p) and hi(t) 6= hj(t), we have texi 6= texj . Notwithstanding the fact that the presence
of the bubble is common knowledge among all rational arbitrageurs, the absence of synchronization
of their market exit allows the bubble to persist and run its course up to a time close to its expected
value (7).
For the price process (1) with (3), equation (11) yields
Ei(µpm(1 + αt˜c(texi ) + 12µmσ
2[p(texi )]
m−1))
Ei(κp)
= hi(t
ex
i ) ∝ (Ti,c − texi )−βi . (12)
This synchronization problem is analogous to that identified by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003),
with the important difference that we emphasize that the lack of synchronization results from the
heterogeneous beliefs concerning the end of the bubble.
The corresponding observable logarithmical return for the asset price reads
rτ (t) = ln p(t+ τ)− ln p(t) = −β ln
(
Tc + t˜c(t+ τ)− (t+ τ)
Tc + t˜c(t)− t
)
= −β ln
(
1 +
∆t˜c(t)− τ
Tc + t˜c(t)− t
)
, (13)
where τ is the time interval between two observations of the price. In the case where Tc is large
enough such that Tc + t˜c(t)− t ∆t˜c(t)− τ , expression (13) can be approximated by its first order
Taylor expansion:
rτ (t) =
β
Tc + t˜c(t)− t
(τ −∆t˜c(t)) = 1
(m− 1)(Tc + t˜c(t)− t)
(τ −∆t˜c(t)) (14)
Therefore, under the condition m → 1 and Tc + t˜c(t) − t → ∞, the logarithmical return rτ (t) is
driven by the change ∆t˜c(t) of the critical time on each trading day. Although t˜c follows an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, i.e., ∆t˜c(t) = −αt˜c(t) + εt, the existence of correlation between successive
returns will be hardly detectable if α is small enough. Conversely, if t˜c follows a unit root process,
the logarithmical return rτ (t) is only dependent on the realization of the gaussian noise term ε. In this
sense, only if Tc is not too far in the future, m is sufficiently larger than 1 and t˜c is stationary, can we
diagnose the existence of a bubble, characterized by the emergence of a transient super-exponential
price growth of the form (5).
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3 Second bubble model: finite-time singularity in the momentum
price dynamics with stochastic critical time
The price process (5) of the first bubble model might appear extreme, in the sense that the price
diverges on the approach of the critical time T˜c of the end of the bubble. However, such a divergence
cannot run its full course in our model due to the divergence of the crash hazard rate which ensures
that a crash will occur before. The critical time is thus a ghost-like time, which is out-of-reach, and
the price process (5) describes a transient run-up that would diverge only in the hypothetical absence
of any arbitrageur. Here, we consider an alternative model in which the price remains always finite but
the faster-than-exponential growth associated with the bubble is embodied into the price momentum,
i.e., the derivative of the logarithm of the price or logarithmic return.
Defining y(t) = ln p(t), we assume the following process for y(t):
dy = x(1 + γ(x, t))dt+ (σ/µ)xdW (15)
dx = µxm(1 + δ(x, t))dt+ σxmdW , (16)
where the same Wiener process W (t) acts on both dy and dx. The process x(t) plays the role of an
effective price momentum. To see this, consider the special case γ(x, t) = 0. Then, expression (15)
reduces to dy = xdt + (σ/µ)xdW , which shows that x(t)dt = E[dy] and thus x(t) is the average
momentum of the price, defined as the instantaneous time derivative of the expected logarithm of
the price. The dynamics of the log-price described by (15) with (16) is similar to previous models
(Bouchaud and Cont, 1998; Farmer, 2002; Ide and Sornette, 2002; Sornette and Ide, 2002), which
argued for the presence of some inertia in the price formation process. This inertia is related to
the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001; Carhart, 1997; Xue, 2003; Cooper et al.,
2004). Intuitively, a price process involving both dy and dx holds if the price variation from today
to tomorrow is based in part on decisions using analyses of the price change between yesterday (and
possibly earlier times) and today.
In the (unrealistic) deterministic limit γ(x, t) = δ(x, t) = σ = 0, the two equations (15) and (16)
reduce to the deterministic equation
d2y
dt2
= µ
(
dy
dt
)m
, (17)
whose solution reads, for m > 2,
y(t) = A−B(Tc − t)1−β , (18)
where β = 1
m−1 , Tc = (β/µ)(
dp
dt
∣∣
t=t0
)−
1
β , B = 1
1−β (µ/β)
−β and A = p(Tc). The condition m > 2
ensures that 0 < 1 − β < 1. Therefore, the log-price y(t) exhibits a finite-time singularity (FTS) at
Tc. But this FTS is of a different type than in the model of the previous section: here, y(t) remains
finite at t = Tc and equal to some value A = p(Tc). The singularity is expressed via the divergence of
the momentum x(t) = dy/dt which diverges at t = Tc. As in the previous model, this FTS embodies
the positive feedback mechanism, in which a high price momentum x pushes even further the demand
so that the return and its volatility tend to be nonlinear accelerating functions of x. In the previous
model, it is the price that provides a feedback on further price moves, rather than the price momentum
used here.
Motivated by this simple analytical solution (18), we complement the general process (15,16) by
specifying γ(x, t) and δ(p, t) in order to obtain solutions with stochastic finite time singularities in
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the momentum with finite prices. We postulate the following specific processes
γ(x, t) = αt˜c(t) +
σ2
2µ
[x(t)]m−1 (19)
δ(x, t) = αt˜c(t) +
1
2
mµσ2[x(t)]m−1 (20)
where
dt˜c = −αt˜cdt+ (σ/µ)dW (21)
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with zero unconditional mean. The Wiener process in (21) is
the same as the one in (15,16), which reflects that the same series of news or shocks move log-price,
momentum and anticipated critical time. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Provided that γ(x, t) and δ(p, t) follow the processes given respectively by (19) and
(20), then the solution of (15,16) for the log-price y(t) = ln p(t) can be written under a form similar
to expression (18) as follows,
y(t) = A−B(Tc + t˜c(t)− t)1−β (22)
where
β =
1
m− 1 , Tc =
β
µ
x
1/β
0 , x0 := x(t = 0) , B =
1
1− β (β/µ)
β , (23)
and A is a constant.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in appendix B.
Expression (22) describes a log-price trajectory exhibiting a FTS occurring at an unknown future
critical time Tc + t˜c(t) which itself follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck walk. In the same manner as
in the previous model of the preceding section, we assume that there is no coordination mechanism
that would ensure the exchange of information among the sophisticated arbitrageurs concerning their
expectation of the time Tc + t˜c(t) of the end of the bubble. Following step by step the same reasoning
as in the previous section, we conclude that Proposition 2 also holds for the present model. Being
aware of the escalating level of the bubble that has not yet burst, each arbitrageur will ride the bubble
for a while and identify the best exit strategy according to the maximization of her risk-adjusted return
based on her belief. Proposition 2 determines that the exit time texi for arbitrageur i is the solution of
Ei
[
p(texi )x(t
ex
i )(1 + γ(x(t
ex
i ), t
ex
i )) +
σ2
2µ2
p(texi )[x(t
ex
i )]
2
]
Ei [κp(texi )]
= hi(t
ex
i ) ∝ (Ti,c − texi )−βi . (24)
The observable logarithmic return for the asset price corresponding to (22) reads
rτ (t) = y(t+ τ)− y(t) = −B[(Tc + t˜c(t+ τ)− (t+ τ))1−β − (Tc + t˜c(t)− t)1−β] (25)
= −B(Tc + t˜c(t)− t)1−β[(1 + ∆t˜c(t)− τ
Tc + t˜c(t)− t
)1−β − 1] (26)
For future potential critical times Tc sufficiently far away from the present time t such that Tc+ t˜c(t)−
t ∆t˜c(t)− τ , expression (26) can be simplified into
rτ (t) = − (1− β)B
(Tc + t˜c(t)− t)β
(∆t˜c(t)− τ) = µ
−β
[(m− 1)(Tc + t˜c(t)− t)]β
· (τ −∆t˜c(t)) (27)
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Eq.(27) has a structure similar to that of Eq.(14). For weak positive feedback of the momentum on
itself (m → 2+) and when Tc is large enough so that µ(Tc + t˜c(t) − t) is slowly varying, then the
logarithmical return rs is essentially driven by ∆t˜c(t), i.e., the change of critical time disclosed by
every trading day is the main stochastic process. The Geometric Brownian Motion is then recovered
as an approximation in this limit when the correlation time of the Orstein-Uhlenbeck process driving
the critical goes to zero.
4 Empirical tests of the two bubble models
We have proposed two models in which a financial bubble is characterized by a transient faster-than-
exponential growth culminating into a finite-time singularity at some potential critical time. Because
our two models reduce to a standard GBM in appropriate limits, the diagnostic of the presence of
bubbles according to our two models lies in the conjunction of three pieces of evidence that charac-
terize specific deviations from the GBM regime: (i) the proximity of the calibrated potential critical
date Tc to the end of the time window in which the calibration of the models are made; (ii) the re-
constructed time series of the critical time t˜c should be stationary and thus reject a standard unit-root
test; (iii) the critical exponent m should be significant larger than 1, a condition for the existence of
the super-exponential regime proposed to characterize bubbles.
4.1 Construction of alarms from the first model
Given a financial time series of close prices at the daily scale, our purpose is to develop a procedure
using the model of section 2 to diagnose the presence of bubbles. We use time windows of 750 trading
days that we slide with a time step of 25 days from the beginning to the end of the available financial
time series. The number of such windows is therefore equal to the total number of trading days in
the financial time series minus 750 and divided by 25. For each window, the purpose is to decide
if the model of section 2 diagnoses an on-going bubble or not and then to compare with the actual
subsequent realization of a crash that we consider as the validation step.
For each window ]ti− 750, ti] ending at ti, we transform the price time series in that window into
a critical time series by inverting expression (5) for T˜c,i(t):
T˜c,i(t) =
1
K
1
[p(t)]1/β
+ t, t = ti − 749, · · ·, ti . (28)
The critical time series T˜c,i(t) is defined over the window i ending at ti. If the model was exact and
no stochastic component was present, and in absence of estimation errors, T˜c,i(t) would be a constant
equal to Tc defined in (6). In the presence of an expected strong stochastic component, we estimate
Tc according to (7) as the arithmetical average of T˜c,i(t)
Tc,i =
1
750
750∑
t=1
T˜c,i(t) . (29)
We can then construct t˜c,i(t) as
t˜c,i(t) = T˜c,i(t)− Tc,i . (30)
The transformation (28) from a non-stationary possibly explosive price process p(t) into what should
be a stationary time series T˜c,i(t) in absence of misspecification is a key element of our methodol-
ogy for bubble detection that avoids the problems documented by Granger and Newbold (1974) and
Phillips (1986) resulting from direct calibration of price or log-price time series.
11
It will not have escaped the attention of the reader that the transformation (28) requires the knowl-
edge of the two unknown parameters K and β that specify the bubble process (5). We propose to
determine these two parameters by applying an optimization procedure as follows. Recall that a cru-
cial ingredient of the bubble model is the mean reversal nature of the potential critical time t˜c. This
suggests to apply a unit root test on the reconstructed time series t˜c,i(t) and determine the optimal
values K∗i and β
∗
i as those which make the time series t˜c,i(t) as stationary as possible. We proceed in
two steps. We first search in the space of the two parameters K and β and select an elite list of the
ten best pairs (K, β) (when they exist) which reject a standard unit-root test of non-stationarity at the
99.5% significance level. We implement this procedure with the t-test statistic of the Dickey-Fuller
unit-root test (without intercept). Since the Dickey-Fuller test is a lower test, the smaller the statistics
t, the larger is the probability to reject the null hypothesis that t˜c has unit-root (is non-stationary).
Of course, only a subset of the windows will yield any solution at all, i.e., it is quite often the case
that the Dickey-Fuller unit-root test is not rejected at the 99.5% significance level for any pair (K, β).
For those windows for which there are selected pairs (K, β) according to the Dickey-Fuller test, we
choose the one with the smallest variance for its corresponding time series t˜c,i(t), i.e., such that the
t˜c,i(t)’s are the closest to their mean in the variance sense. This yields the optimal K∗i and β
∗
i that
best “fit” the window i in the sense that this pair of parameters provides the closest approximation to
a stationary time series for t˜c,i(t) given by expression (30) for the potential termination of the bubble.
For a given window i, a diagnostic for the presence of bubble is flagged and an alarm is declared
when
(i) β∗ > 0 such that m > 1 (the signature of a positive feedback in our model) and
(ii) Tc,i − ti < 750, i.e., the estimated termination time of the bubble is not too distant.
Figs.1-3 depicts all the bubble alarms obtained by applying this procedure to three major stock indices,
the US S&P500 index from 1 February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index
from 1 January 1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986
to 30 November 2008. An alarm is indicated by a vertical line positioned on the last day ti of the
corresponding window that passes the two criteria (i-ii). We refine the diagnostic by presenting three
alarm levels, corresponding respectively to Tc,i − ti < 750, Tc,i − ti < 500 and Tc,i − ti < 250: the
closer the estimated termination of the bubble, the stronger should be the evidence for the bubble as
a faster-than-exponential growth. Another indication is the existence of clustering of the alarms. If
indeed a bubble is developing, it should be diagnosed repeatedly by several successive windows.
Fig.1 for the S&P500 index shows that the alarm clusters correctly identify the upcoming of four
significant market corrections or crashes. This suggests to qualify these alarms as correct diagnostic
of bubbles ending in these corrections. The first one is the large cluster localized within 1.5 years
before the ‘Black Monday’ crash of October 1987. The second smaller cluster is associated with a
significant correction starting in July 17, 1990. The third large cluster is also within 1.5 year before
the occurrence of the turmoil starting in August 1998, associated with the default of Russia on its
debt and the devaluation of the ruble. The detection of a bubble starting to develop more than a
year before this event suggests that this event may not have been entirely exogenous, supporting
previous evidence for this claim (Sornette, 2004). The fourth smaller cluster announced the turning
point of the famous Internet-Communication-Technology (ICT) bubble in April 2000. We note that
the strength of the bubble is quite weak for the S&P500 index. This can probably be explained by
the fact that only about 20% of its constituting firms belonged to the ICT sector while the remaining
80% firms belonged to the “old economy” sector. In contrast, the alarm signal is much stronger for
the Nasdaq index, as can be seen in figure 2. One can observe a fifth rather small cluster of alarms
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for Tc,i − ti < 750 (which however disappears for Tc,i − ti < 500 or smaller, suggesting a weak
signal) which is dated Sept. 12, 2005 in the top panel of Fig.1. This alarm does not appear to be
associated to any nearby termination of a rising price regime. However, notice that, in October 2007,
the S&P500 peaked and then started a dramatic accelerating downward spiral fueled by the unfolding
of the global financial crisis. This peak of October 2007 is indeed less than 750 trading days away
from the triggering of the alarm on Sept. 12, 2005. This supports other evidence that the run-up of
the S&P500 from 2003 to October 2007 was a bubble (Sornette and Woodard, 2010). It is however a
failure of the present methodology that the alarm is short-lived and does not confirm the continuing
accelerating trend up to the peak in October 2007.
Fig. 2 paints a similar picture. A first bubble preceding the crash of October 1987 is clearly
diagnosed. A very large cluster of alarms spans the period from at least early 1997 (Phillips et al.,
2007) to 2000, confirming the diagnostic of a running ICT bubble, that ended with a crash in April
2000. This large cluster is actually made of two sub-clusters, the first one associated with the bubble
behavior ending with the so-called Russian crisis at the end the summer of 1998, and the second
one corresponding to the well-known ICT bubble reflecting over-optimistic expectation of a “new
economy”. This is similar to the analysis and conclusion obtained in Fig.1 for the S&P500 index.
There is small cluster of alarms ending in April 1994, which cannot be associated with any large price
movement afterwards. Finally, a fourth cluster of alarms is dated Sept. 12, 2005 in the top panel of
Fig.2. As for the S&P500 index, this cluster of alarms does not appear to be associated to any nearby
termination of a rising price regime, but rather to the development of an accelerating upward trending
price that culminated in October 2007 before crashing in the subsequent year.
Similar conclusions hold for the Hong Kong market, as shown in Fig.3. One can observe the
clusters of alarms associated with the successive booming phases of the Hang Seng index followed
by several corrections or crashes. One can identify in particular the bubbles associated with the strong
correction of 1992, the two Asian crises of 1994 and 1997, as well as the bubble ending in October
2007, which is this time very clearly diagnosed for this Hong Kong market. There is one isolated
false alarm dated Feb. 1, 2001 in the top panel of Fig.3.
4.2 Construction of alarms from the second model
Similarly to the procedure described in section 4.1, we transform a given price time series in a given
window i of 900 successive trading days into what should be a stationary time series of potential
critical end times, if the price series is indeed described by the bubble model of section 3. Inverting
expression (22) in Proposition 3, we get, similarly to expression (28),
T˜c,i(t) = ti +
(
A− ln p(t)
B
) 1
1−β
, t = ti − 899, · · ·, ti . (31)
The critical time series T˜c,i(t) is defined within the window i ending at ti. If the model was exact and
no stochastic component was present, and in absence of estimation errors, T˜c,i(t) would be a constant
equal to Tc defined in (23). The expected critical end time Tc,i of a bubble, if any, is then estimated
for this window i by expression (29) (with 750 replaced by 900). The fluctuations around Tc,i are
described by t˜c,i(t) defined by (30).
As for the first bubble model, the transformation (31) requires the determination of parameters,
here the triplet (A,B, β). For this, we proceed exactly as in the previous subsection, with the Dickey-
Fuller unit-root test applied to the time series t˜c,i(t), followed by the selection of the best triplet
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(A∗, B∗, β∗) that minimize the variance of the time series t˜c,i(t). The search of the additional param-
eter A is performed in an interval bounded from above by 2 maxti−899≤t≤ti ln p(t). Then, for a given
window i, a diagnostic for the presence of bubble is flagged and an alarm is declared when
(i) 0 < β∗ < 1 such that m > 2 (the signature of a positive feedback in the momentum price
dynamics model) and
(ii) −25 ≤ Tc,i − ti ≤ 50, such that the estimated termination time of the bubble is close to the
right side of the time window.
(iii) We further refine the filtering by considering three levels of significance quantified by the value
of the exponent m: level 1 (m > 2), level 2 (m > 2.5) and level 3 (m > 3).
The condition Tc,i − ti ≤ 50 is much more stringent that its counterpart for the first bubble model.
The rational is that the price dynamics in terms of a finite-time singularity in the price momentum
corresponds to a weaker singularity that can only be observed, in the presence of a strong stochastic
component, rather close to the potential singularity. This explains the smaller upper bound of 50
trading days (corresponding approximately to two calendar months). The lower bound of −25 days
accounts for the fact that the analysis is performed in sliding windows with a time step of 25 trading
days.
The results shown in Figs.4-6 complement and refine those obtained with the bubble model tested
in the previous subsection. In general, there are less alarms when using this second model and pro-
cedure, compared with the first bubble model and procedure of subsection 4.1. One can observe in
Fig.4 for the S&P500 index two very well-defined clusters diagnosing a bubble ending with the crash
of October 1987 and another bubble ending in October 2007. The dates indicated in the upper panel,
Oct. 17, 1987 and Oct. 9, 2007, correspond to the right time of the last window in which an alarm
is found for each of these two clusters. The timing is thus remarkably accurate in terms of the de-
termination of the end of each bubble regime. It is interesting that this second model in terms of a
momentum bubble singularity is able to diagnose unambiguously a bubble ending in October 2007,
while the first model diagnosed only an intermediate phase of this price development. This bubble can
be referred to as the “real-estate-MBS” bubble (MBS stands for morgage-backed security, Sornette
and Woodard (2010)). Using the level 1 filter for the positive feedback exponent m, we observe in
addition three false alarms. Raising the condition that m should be larger than 2.5 (respectively 3)
removes two (respectively all) of these false alarms.
Fig.5 for the Nasdaq Composite index identifies the two bubbles ending in March 2000 (the “new
economy” ICT bubble) and in Oct. 2007, without any false alarm.
Fig.6 for the Heng Seng of Hong Kong similarly diagnoses these two bubbles as well as those
ending with the 1992 and 1994 Asian events.
5 Concluding remarks
We have developed two rational expectation models of financial bubbles with heterogeneous rational
arbitrageurs. Two key ingredients characterize these models: (i) the existence of a positive feedback
quantified by a nonlinear power law dependence of price growth as a function of either price or
momentum; (ii) the stochastic mean-reversion dynamics of the termination time of the bubble. The
first model characterizes a bubble as a faster-than-exponential accelerating stochastic price ending in
a finite-time singularity at a stochastic critical time. The second model views a bubble as a regime
characterized by an accelerating momentum ending at a finite time singularity, also with at a stochastic
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critical time. This second model has the additional feature of taking into account the existence of some
inertia in the price formation process, which is related to the momentum effect.
In these two models, the heterogeneous arbitrageurs exhibit distinct perception for the rising risk
of a crash as the bubble develops. Each arbitrageur is assumed to know the price formation process
and to determine her exit time so as to maximize her expected gain. The resulting distribution of
exit times lead to a synchronization problem, preventing arbitraging of the bubble and allowing it to
continue its course up to close to its potential critical time.
The explicit analytical solutions of the two models allow us to propose nonlinear transformations
of the price time series into stochastic critical time series. The qualification of a bubble regime then
boils down to characterize the nature of the transformed stochastic critical time series, thereby avoid-
ing the difficult problem of parameter estimation of the stochastic differential equation describing the
price dynamics. We develop an operational procedure that qualifies the existence of a running bubble
(i) if the critical time series is found to reject a standard unit-root test at a high confidence level, (ii)
if the exponent m of the nonlinear power law characterizing the positive feedback is sufficient large
and (iii) if the expected critical time is not too distant from the time of the analysis.
The two procedures derived from the two bubble models have been applied to three financial mar-
kets, the US S&P500 index from 1 February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite
index from 1 January 1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December
1986 to 30 November 2008. Specifically, we have developed criteria to flag an alarm for the presence
of a bubble, that we validate by determining if the diagnosed bubble is followed by a crash in short
order. Remarkably, we find that the major known crashes over these periods are correctly identified
with few false alarms. The method using the second bubble model in terms of a finite-time singularity
of the price momentum seems to be more reliable with fewer false alarms and a better detection of
the two principal bubbles phases characterizing the last 30 years or so.
These results suggest the feasibility of advance bubble warning.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let n = m− 1 and z = p−n. Employing Ito¨ lemma for equation (1), we have
dz =
∂z
∂p
dp+
1
2
∂2p
∂p2
(dp)2 (32)
= −np−m(µpm[1 + δ(p, t)]dt+ σpmdW )− 1
2
n(−n− 1)p−m−1σ2p2mdt (33)
= −nµ(1 + δ(p, t)− 1
2
(n+ 1)σ2µpm−1)dt+ nσdW (34)
Recalling that δ(p, t) = αt˜c + 12mµσ
2pm−1, the previous expression can be simplified into
dz = −nµdt+ nµ(−αt˜cdt+ σ
µ
dW ) (35)
= −nµdt+ nµ dt˜c (36)
Integrating both sides of the above equation and with x(t = 0) = p−n0 , we obtain
p = (nµ)−
1
n [Tc + t˜c − t]− 1n , Tc = p
−n
0
nµ
. (37)
Replacing n by 1
β
, this reproduces the solution (5).
B Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We now check that equation (22) is the solution of the SDEs (15) and (16). For this, we apply
Ito¨ lemma on equation (22) by regarding ln pt as a function of t˜c. This leads to
d ln p =
∂p
∂t
dt+
∂p
∂t˜c
dt˜c +
1
2
∂2p
∂t˜2c
(dt˜c)
2 (38)
= (1− β)B(Tc + t˜c − t)−βdt− (1− β)B(Tc + t˜c − t)−βdt˜c (39)
+
1
2
β(1− β)B(Tc + t˜c − t)−β−1(σ/µ)2dt (40)
Taking into account that B = 1
1−β (β/µ)
β and let Z represent (β/µ)β[Tc + t˜c − t]−β , the above
expression can be rewritten as
d ln p = Z
[
1 + αt˜c +
1
2
(σ2/µ)Z
1
β
]
dt+ Z(σ/µ)dW . (41)
On the other hand, it is easy to see that Z is the solution of (16) in the light of Proposition 1, which
leads to Z = x. Furthermore, we note that αt˜c + σ
2
2µ
Z
1
β is nothing but γ(Z, t). Therefore ln pt given
by (22) satisfies both (15) and (16).
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Figure 1: Logarithm of the historical S&P500 stock index and corresponding alarms shown in the
three lower panels as vertical lines indicating the ends of the windows of 750 trading days in which our
procedure using the first bubble model of section 2 flags a diagnostic for the presence of bubble. The
three lower panels corresponds to alarms for which Tc,i−ti < 750, Tc,i−ti < 500 and Tc,i−ti < 250,
from top to bottom. By definition, the set of alarms of the lowest panel is included in the set of alarms
of the middle panel which is itself included in the set of alarms of the upper panel. The exponents
m found for the upper panel corresponding to Tc,i − ti < 750 have a mean of 2.76 with a standard
deviation of 0.33.
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Figure 2: Same as Fig.1 for the Nasdaq Composite index. The exponents m found for the upper panel
corresponding to Tc,i − ti < 750 have a mean of 2.85 with a standard deviation of 0.23.
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Figure 3: Same as Fig.1 for the Heng Seng index of Hong Kong. The exponents m found for the
upper panel corresponding to Tc,i − ti < 750 have a mean of 2.84 with a standard deviation of 0.22.
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Figure 4: Logarithm of the historical S&P500 stock index and corresponding alarms shown in the
three lower panels as vertical lines indicating the ends of the windows of 900 trading days in which
our procedure using the second bubble model of section 3 flags a diagnostic for the presence of bubble.
The three lower panels corresponds to alarms for which m > 2, m > 2.5 and m > 3, from top to
bottom. By definition, the set of alarms of the lowest panel is included in the set of alarms of the
middle panel which is itself included in the set of alarms of the upper panel.
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Figure 5: Same as Fig.4 for the Nasdaq Composite index.
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Figure 6: Same as Fig.4 for the Heng Seng index of Hong Kong.
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